PROCESSING OF I-130 PETITIONS SPEEDS UP FOR AN EXPANDING GROUP OF US CITIZENS

By Cyrus D. Mehta

In Delays for Overseas Spouses of US Citizens Seeking Green Cards I reported about the slowdown in the processing of I-130 petitions filed by US citizens on behalf of immediate relatives, such as spouses, minor children and parents, who are outside the United States. As a result of widespread concern about the delays, the USCIS seems to have reacted positively and sent the following e mail to its stakeholders:

From: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [mailto:uscis@public.govdelivery.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2013 3:38 PM
Subject: USCIS Message: Update on the processing times of Form I-130s filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives

Dear Stakeholder,

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has received communications from the public expressing concerns regarding extended processing times for Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives. USCIS provides information below in response to the concerns expressed.

USCIS is ever-mindful of the need to process a U.S. citizen’s immediate relative Form I-130 carefully and expeditiously. The need is defined by the immigration system’s goal of preserving family unity. It is for this fundamental reason that USCIS has been focused on addressing delays in the processing of these Forms I-130 for several months.

Through concerted efforts, USCIS is now adjudicating U.S. citizens’ immediate relative Forms I-130 filed as early as February 2013. This is a significant step forward, as previously published guidance reflected the processing of these Forms I-130 filed in October 2012. Furthermore, USCIS expects the processing of these Forms I-130 to be increasingly timely in the ensuing weeks, culminating in the return to an average processing time of five months for these Forms I-130 by May 2014.

USCIS has focused on these Forms I-130 for the very reason that affected members of the public have expressed their concerns; the importance of family unity. Last month, in an effort to expedite the adjudication of these cases, USCIS began transferring stand-alone Forms I-130 filed by U.S. citizens for their immediate relatives from USCIS’s National Benefits Center to its Nebraska, Texas, and California Service Centers. This shift improves USCIS’s ability to adjudicate the cases in a timely manner.

When You Receive a Notice of Transfer of Your Case

If your case was transferred, USCIS will send you a notice listing the transfer date and where your case will be processed. Your original receipt number will not change and this will not further delay the processing of your case. USCIS will take action on your case within 60 days of the transfer date listed in your notice.

How to Track the Status of Your Case

We have recently updated the USCIS website at www.uscis.gov<http://www.uscis.gov/> with processing times for Form I-130 cases filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives. Please check the processing times<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplay.do> for your petition before inquiring about your case. If your case is transferred to another USCIS office, you should refer to the processing times for the office that has received your case.

You can check the status of your case at www.uscis.gov<http://www.uscis.gov/> by entering your receipt number in the “Check Status<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard/CaseStatus.do>” field. Additionally, you can sign up to receive automatic case status updates<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/jsps/selectusertype.jsp;jsessionid=bacEczm0-YrdshKqQwGgu> by email as your case is processed. If you have not received a decision on your case within the published processing time, you may submit an inquiry using e-Request<https://egov.uscis.gov/e-request/Case.do> or contact the National Customer Service Center (NCSC) at 1-800-375-5283. For TDD hearing impaired assistance, please call 1-800-767-1833. When making any case status inquiries, you should reference your original receipt number and indicate that your case was transferred to a new location.

If you have filed a Form I-130 and you receive a request for evidence or any other type of communication from USCIS, please read the notice carefully to ensure that you respond to the same service center that sent you the notice.

If you move while your case is pending, you can change your address on the USCIS website<https://egov.uscis.gov/crisgwi/go?action=coa> or contact the NCSC so that USCIS can notify you of any further action on your case. It is important that you notify USCIS of any change of address as soon as possible after moving.

We appreciate the concerns that members of the public have expressed on this important subject. We are mindful of those concerns and are addressing them with great diligence.

Kind Regards,

USCIS Public Engagement Division

It is indeed welcome news that USCIS is endeavoring to speed up the processing of I-130 petitions of US citizens, and restore the original processing times of five months or less. While the granting of immigration benefits is contentious in today’s political environment, seldom dispute the ability of a US citizen to swiftly bring into this country a foreign national whom he or she has married overseas. The number of US citizens who can file I-130 petitions on behalf of spouses has recently expanded after Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor, thus enabling US citizens to  also file I-130 petitions on behalf of same sex spouses. These spouses were unjustly deprived of a benefit for years on end as a result of an unconstitutional statute, and they should not be required to wait that much longer for the I-130 petition to get approved.

As an aside, the class of US citizens who can file I-130 petitions on behalf of overseas relatives may be expanding to even dead petitioners. I heard today that attorney Michael Piston was able to obtain an approval for the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen mother who died after her I-130 petition filed on  his behalf was approved. The son was outside the U.S. and could not take advantage of INA section 204(l), which allows beneficiaries to apply for a green card if they were in  the US at the time of the petitioner’s death. Humanitarian reinstatement was also denied. Mr. Piston, who is widely admired for successfully pushing the envelope on interpretations of our immigration laws, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California contending that the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen remained the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen even after the citizen died. The USCIS settled the law suit and approved the I-130 petition.  Such a law suit could not have been successful outside the court in California where it was initiated because the Ninth Circuit in Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010), held in the context of the INA section 212(a)(1)(H)(I)) waiver that the “spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States” does not mean that they have to be the spouse, parent, son or daughter of a “living citizen of the United States.” This ruling, which currently is limited to California and other states that come within the ambit of the Ninth Circuit, could potentially be extended to beneficiaries of I-130 petitions too where the citizen has died, and theoretically allow the estates of deceased US citizens to file I-130 petitions on behalf of qualifying relatives who are overseas.

In any event, it is heartening to know that the USCIS heard the widespread concerns of “living” US citizens who justifiably want to unite with their loves ones as quickly as possible. It is hoped that the USCIS could also respond to the concerns of other stakeholders, such as US companies, who often have a hard time transferring their specialized knowledge employees on L-1B visas into the US as a result of unreasonable denials. Our immigration laws have been designed to promote family unity as well as promote economic well-being, and the USCIS would clearly be benefitting the national interests of the country it yielded to the  concerns of all legitimate stakeholders who depend on the fair and expeditious processing of immigration benefits applications. 

PAROLE IN PLACE: THE SECRET SAUCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

On November 15, 2013, the USCIS issued a Policy Memorandum formalizing the granting of parole to persons who are present in the United States without admission or parole and who are spouses, children and parents of US citizens serving in the US military or who previously served in the US military. While parole traditionally applies to those who seek to come to the United States, the expansion of this concept to those already here is known as “parole in place”.

According to this memo, military preparedness can be potentially adversely affected if active members of the military worry about the immigration status of their spouses, parents and children. The memo makes a similar commitment to veterans who have served and sacrificed for the nation, and who can face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family members. Such persons can now formally apply for parole in place (PIP) through a formal procedure pursuant to the ability of the government to grant parole under INA section 212(d)(5)(A). PIP would allow them to adjust status in the US rather than travel abroad for consular processing of their immigrant visas and thus potentially triggering the 3 or 10 year bars.

As a quick background, an individual who is in the US without admission or parole cannot adjust status through an immediate relative such as a US citizen spouse, parent or son or daughter. This person is inherently inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), which provides: 

An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) renders an alien inadmissible under two related grounds: 1) an alien present in the US without being admitted or paroled or 2) an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

The grant of PIP to a person who is present in the US without being admitted or paroled can wipe out the first ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). PIP would then also allow this person to adjust status in the US under section 245(a) - as the person needs to have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” – without needing to leave the US.  The ability to adjust status through PIP would obviate the need  to travel overseas and apply for the visa, and thus trigger the 3 or 10 year bar pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and (ii). Since there will be no departure triggering the 3 and 10 year bars, this person would no longer need to file a waiver or an advance provisional waiver by demonstrating extreme hardship to a qualifying US citizen relative to overcome the 3 and 10 year bars before leaving the US.

So far so good, but how does one overcome the second ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)A)(i), which relates to “an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General?” The memo skillfully interprets this clause as relating to an alien who is in the process of arriving in the US without inspection. Thus, the second ground only applies to an alien who is presently arriving in the US while the first ground applies to an alien who already arrived in the US without admission or parole. If the second ground is interpreted as applying to an alien who arrived in the past, then it would make the first ground superfluous, according to the memo. It would also then make the 3 year bar under INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) superfluous as a person who at any point arrived, if used in the past tense,  at a place or time other than designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security would be  permanently inadmissible rather than inadmissible for only 3 years. Thus, if the second ground of inadmissibility is no longer applicable with respect to an alien who has already arrived in the US, then the grant of PIP would allow such a person to adjust in the US by overcoming the first ground under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

The extension of PIP to the families of current or former military service men and women is a proper recognition of their contribution to the nation and an attempt to benefit those who have given so much to the rest of us.  While such logic is compelling, why not expand its application to other instances where aliens have served and strengthened the national interest or performed work in the national interest? How about granting PIP to families of, outstanding researchers striving to unlock the mysteries of science and technology, those with exceptional or extraordinary ability, and key employees of US companies doing important jobs for which qualified Americans cannot be found? And there is also a compelling interest in ensuring family unification so that US citizens or permanent residents may feel less stressed and can go on to have productive lives that will in turn help the nation.  All such people do us proud by making our cause their own and the need of their loved ones to come in from the shadows is real and present. Indeed, the non-military use of PIP was advocated by top USCIS officials several years ago in a memo to USCIS Director Mayorkas, a memo leaked by its critics who wished successfully to kill it.

In the face of inaction on the part of the GOP controlled House to enact immigration reform, granting PIP to all immediate relatives of US citizens would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.

The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the memo currently states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. What about INA section 245(c)(2)’s insistence on “lawful immigration status” at the snapshot moment of I-485 submission?  Even this would not be a problem. For purposes of section  245(c) of the Act, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend  that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.

There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also  to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above.  Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.”  Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status,  would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.

There are two ways to achieve progress. Congress can change the law, which it persists in refusing to do, or the President can interpret the existing law in new ways, which he has done.  The holistic approach to parole for which we argue is a prime example of this second approach. The term “status” is not defined anywhere in the INA.  By ordinary English usage, “parolee status” is a perfectly natural way of describing someone who has been paroled. Parole is a lawful status in the sense that, by virtue of the parole, it is lawful for the parolee to remain in the United States, at least for the authorized period of time under prescribed terms and conditions. We credit David Isaacson for suggesting that there are other instances in the INA where lawful status does not automatically equate to nonimmigrant status: for examples, asylum status under INA Section 208 and refugee status under INA section 207 are lawful statuses, even though strictly speaking, neither an asylee nor a refugee is a nonimmigrant according to the INA Section 101(a)(15) definition of that term. The Executive can easily revise the memo for military families to declare parole under INA  section 212(d)(5) a status  because it has already declared parole a lawful status for NA 245(c)(2) purposes under 8 C.F.R. 245(d)(v), asylum a lawful status under INA section 208, and refugee a lawful status under INA section 207.  See 8 C.F.R. 245.1(d)(iii)-(iv). In all three cases, people are allowed into the United States in a capacity that is nether legal permanent residence nor, strictly speaking, nonimmigrant.  True, INA section 101(a)(13)(B) does say that parolees are not “admitted”, but is one who enters without admission and is granted asylum under INA 208 ever been “admitted” per the statutory definition of that term? Yet, such a person has a lawful status.

One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 and 10 year bars.  Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the 3 or 10 year bars, as well as trying to overcome the bars by demonstrating extreme hardship to qualifying relatives, which is a very high standard. Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation.

 There is no doubt that the memo for military families is a meaningful example of immigration remediation through executive initiative. Yet, it is one step in what can and should be a much longer journey. In the face on intractable congressional resistance, we urge the President to take this next step.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is Senior Counsel at FosterQuan)

THE AMBIGUOUS B-1 VISA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE INFOSYS SETTLEMENT

By Cyrus D. Mehta

Infosys is one of India’s most storied IT companies with a roster of impressive clients in the US, including named Wall Street Banks, Silicon Valley companies, retail chains, insurance companies and manufacturers. With a footprint all over the world and known for its integrity and probity, it thus came as a surprise that the United States accused Infosys of malfeasance in procuring visas for its foreign national employees to come to the US.

The US Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, launched an investigation in 2011 into Infosys’s alleged misuse of B-1 business visas. The investigation was spurred by a whistleblower’s law suit that made similar allegations, which got dismissed. On October 30, 2013, Infosys reached a settlement agreeing to pay a civil fine of $34 million to the US government, the biggest fine ever paid for an immigration case, but did not admit to the allegations of fraud and malfeasance.

There are plenty of lessons one can take away from the Settlement Agreement upon an objective review. Despite the seriousness of the allegations, Infosys did not incur any criminal liability. For instance, the government accused, among other things, the IT giant for bringing its employees on B-1 business visas to the United States to actually perform work. The government further accused Infosys of generating invitation letters to US consular officials indicating that their purpose of travel was for “meetings” and “discussion” when the true purpose was to work in the US, which can only be performed under the more onerous H-1B visa, such as coding and programming. Infosys, on the other hand, countered that it has always used the B-1 visa for legitimate purposes and not to circumvent the H-1B visa. Infosys also stated that the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual permits other activities under the B-1 visa provided that they are incident to international trade or commerce, including those alleged by the US to be improper, such as coding and programming. The government also accused Infosys of directing its employees to misrepresent that they would be performing work at the location stated on the Labor Condition Application (LCA) underlying the H-1B visa petition, when they would actually be going to work at another location. Infosys also denied this accusation. Infosys, however, admitted to violations concerning its obligations to verify employees on form I-9. Still, despite the denial of any fraud or malfeasance, Infosys paid a humongous fine of $34 million.

It was indeed the ambiguity in the B-1 rules that snared Infosys and it was the same ambiguity in the B-1, which ultimately saved it from criminal liability. This is evident in the statement of the lead prosecutor in the case, Shamoil Shipchandler, who is quoted in a Wall Street Journal article:

“It’s not 100% clear what someone who holds a B-1 visa can actually do,” he said. For example, placing someone within a company for six months to do in-house tech support is an improper use of a B-1 visa. But if a consultant helps refine software during a meeting with a client, as part of a larger project, that could be seen as an appropriate use of a visitor visa, Mr. Shipchandler said. “It’s a murky area, but for our purposes they misled consular officials.”

As we noted in a prior blog on the B-1 category, the B-1 business visa remains one of the “most ill-defined” visas but plays a very important role in providing flexibility to business travelers. While the B-1 visa is associated with visiting the US to participate in meetings and negotiate contracts, it can have broader purposes. For example, the “B-1 in lieu of H-1B” was created to facilitate travel to the US of individuals who would otherwise qualify for an H-1B visa, but only needed to come to the United States for a limited period of time. In the current controversy over the B-1 visa, scant attention has been paid to the “B-1 in lieu of the H-1B,” which permits broader activities than the regular B-1 visa, albeit for a short period of time. Indeed, many of the activities that have been alleged to be outside the scope of the B-1 may be permissible under the “B-1 in lieu of the H-1B.” The case law with respect to business visitors only adds to the confusion over the definition of “business” in the US.  In Matter of Hira, 11 I. & N. Dec. 824, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the term “business” does not include ordinary labor for hire, but is limited to intercourse of a commercial character. The BIA concluded that an alien entering with a B-1 visa to “study the US business market”, who on behalf of his employer (a Hong Kong based manufacturer of custom made men’s clothing), took orders from, and the measurements of, prospective customers in the United States whom he did not solicit; and who then sent the orders, together with the purchase price, to his employer overseas, was engaged in “intercourse of a commercial character,” and was eligible for B-1 visitor for business classification. The BIA specifically stated that Hira’s sojourn in the US was of a “temporary character” and he clearly intended to continue his foreign residence at the termination of his authorized stay. The profits of Hira’s B-1 activities also accrued to the foreign entity. The BIA, however, also clarified that the nature of the business activity itself need not be temporary. The BIA held that for B-1 purposes, the business relationship may be of a continuing or long standing nature. The only condition in this respect is that each visit be temporary in duration. While applicants can make their best case under the ambiguous standards of the B-1 visa in a forthright manner, deception and malfeasance can never be tolerated. 

Even though Infosys is allowed to continue to access US visas in the future under the settlement, which also expressly ensures that past investigations  or alleged wrongful conduct will not be used to prejudice future applications, this episode is a wakeup call for others to ensure that corporations exercise good governance with respect to immigration matters. There is bound to be stricter scrutiny in the future of all applicants, and there is little doubt that Congress in future legislation may also use the Infosys example to tighten the ability for IT consulting firms to access business and work visas, as it has already accomplished in S. 744. Still, this episode can prove to be a valuable teaching moment for Infosys and other IT consulting firms. One of the conditions under the settlement agreement is that Infosys will provide more detailed description of the activities that will be performed when an applicant applies for a B-1 visa. As the B-1 visa allows a wide range of permissible activities, a best industry practice can evolve to specify the proposed activities in some detail, and the legal basis for them, when applicants apply for a B-1 visa or at the time of seeking admission at a port of entry. As a quid pro quo, it is hoped that the government will also seriously adjudicate such applications on their merits.

The work location indicated in the LCAs of H-1B workers in the IT consulting industry are also bound to change after the initial filing. Interestingly, the settlement agreement does not suggest that the employer file an amended H-1B petition, and instead, only alleged that Infosys did not submit a new LCA covering the new location. In the future, employers should immediately file new LCAs to cover the new locations after the original location has changed, and make disclosure at the time of applying for a visa or at the port of entry. It may also be prudent for the employer to proactively file LCAs in future anticipated locations, whenever feasible, in case there is a change in the work location, thus obviating the need to submit one after the H-1B petition is already approved. It is further hoped that the government will not insist on the more cumbersome and expensive H-1B amendment, which was not suggested in the settlement agreement.

It goes without saying that employers must also be compliant with their I-9 obligations. While there have been no dearth in enforcement actions for I-9 violations, the action against Infosys was novel as it involved allegations of misuse of the B-1 visa in addition to the I-9 violations, while Infosys countered by saying that its use of the B-1 was proper. Despite the settlement, the scope of the B-1 visa continues to remain ambiguous, although it would behoove employers to articulate the reasons for the B-1 visa in an application and then to have their employees abide by the terms and conditions upon visiting the US.

As noted in a prior blog, it is important too for the end user client company to be vigilant to ensure that foreign national workers assigned to the company are working under the appropriate visa categories. In the event that the end user client has knowledge or encourages activities not authorized under these visa categories, there is potential for the company to be ensnared in criminal liability.  Even short of criminal liability, it is important to make sure due diligence has been done to avoid being caught up in an embarrassing investigation against a partner company. If the end user company urgently needs software engineers through its IT contracting company for a project, a manager within the end user company may be requested to write a let­ter as a client of the contracting compa­ny to justify the need for its employee overseas to visit the US on a B-1 visa. If this letter indicates that the software engineer is required for meetings, or to conduct an analysis of the project to be subsequently worked on overseas (an obviously per­missible B-1 activity), but the actual pur­pose is for the engineer to actually par­ticipate in programming and working on the solution in the U.S., it may come back to haunt the end user company if there is a criminal investigation against the IT contracting company. Therefore, when drafting such a letter, it is important to ensure that the proposed activities discussed in the letter are per­missible B-1 activities, and when the foreign national arrives, he or she engages in activities that are consistent with the listed activities.  Of course, if the foreign national is assigned to perform work at the client company, the end user must ensure that the worker has an appropriate work visa such as the H-1B visa. End user clients must cooperate with the sponsoring employer to post the LCA at their sites.

Some years ago Wal-Mart was criminally investigated for engaging janitors as independent contractors when it knew that they were not authorized to work in the US. The investigation ended with a consent decree in 2005 where Wal-Mart like Infosys did not also acknowledge any wrong doing,  although the practices that have emerged from that episode with respect to ensuring that even employees of independent contracting companies have I-9s have become the gold standard. While its reputation has taken a beating - not to mention that Indian heritage IT firms even if compliant have borne the brunt of intense governmental scrutiny in recent years - Infosys also has the opportunity to develop gold standard best practices in the B-1 and other arenas (such as tracking work sites of their employees under the LCA) to not only comply with the terms of the settlement but to also assure its prestigious clients who must be anxious after the settlement.

Infosys should consider itself fortunate that it did not go down in flames like Enron or Anderson, and has been given another chance. It must seize this opportunity to redeem itself by elevating standards and best practices, which others will follow and which the government will hopefully honor.  In conclusion, the following quote from US Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas is worth noting:

“Infosys persuaded me and our partners that they could be fully fledged legal participants in the immigration process of the United States, so we'll see," Bales said. He added that Infosys hired American workers and was valuable to the American economy, and "we're not in the business of putting people out of business when they provide value.”