By Gary Endelman
and Cyrus Mehta
Article II, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution provides that the President “shall take Care that the laws be
faithfully executed.” That being so,
can President Obama grant deferred
action for childhood arrivals (DACA) whose presence
here represents a violation of US law? Professors Robert Delahunty and John Yoo
offer a scholarly and resounding “ No” to this question in their paper, The
Obama Administration, the DREAM Act and the Take Care Clause
(hereinafter cited as Delahanty & Yoo).
They argue that the President must
enforce the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Absent
either express or implied authority to the contrary, the Obama Administration
has violated its constitutional duty. No
presidential prerogative exists that would sustain such non-enforcement nor has
the President put forward a cogent excuse that would make his DACA decision
constitutionally permissible. Professors
Delahunty and Yoo offer up George Washington’s famous reminder in his Proclamation
of September 15, 1702 that “it is the particular duty of the Executive ‘to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Such a serious charge requires an
answer. That is why we write.
We agree with
Professors Delahunty and Yoo that President Obama must enforce all provisions
of the INA, including the removal sections contained in Section 235. We do not agree, however, that DHS
Secretary Napolitano’s June 15, 2012 memorandum,
or ICE
Director John Morton’s June 17, 2011 directive on
prosecutorial discretion, instructed or encouraged ICE officers to violate
federal law. At current levels of
funding, it is manifestly impossible for ICE to deport most undocumented
persons in the United States. Even at
the historically high levels of removal under President Obama, some 400,000 per
year, this amounts to only 3-4% of the total illegal population. Delahanty & Yoo n.21. That is precisely why the Obama Administration
has focused its removal efforts on “identifying and removing criminal aliens,
those who pose a threat to public safety and national security, repeat
immigration law offenders and other individuals prioritized for removal.” Delahanty & Yoo n. 22, citing
Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, to
Senator Richard Dubin (D-Ill.)(Aug. 18, 2011). Far from refusing to enforce the law, President Obama is actually
seeking to honor his constitutional obligation by creating a scheme that
removes some while deferring the removal of others without granting anyone
legal status, something only Congress can do.
Professors Delahanty
and Yoo’s characterization of DACA relief as detached, even radical, suffers
from a lack of an informed appreciation of the extent to which it has deep
roots in existing immigration law. The truth is that deferred action is neither
recent nor revolutionary. Widows of US citizens have been granted this benefit.
Battered immigrants have sought and obtained refuge there. Never has the size of a vulnerable population
been a valid reason to say no. The extension of DACA relief is less a leap into
the unknown arising out of a wild, lawless ideology divorced from a proper
respect for the Take Care Clause than a sober reaffirmation of an existing tool
for remediation in prior emergencies. Professor Delahanty and Yoo conveniently
omits any mention of INA Section 103(a)(1), which charges the DHS Secretary
with the administration and enforcement of the INA. This implies that the DHS
can decide when to and when not to remove an alien. They also fail to consider
INA Section 274A(h)(3)(B) which excludes from the definition of “unauthorized
alien” any alien “authorized to be so employed …by the Attorney General.” After
all, 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(14), which grants employment authorization to one who has
received deferred action, has been around for several decades. The only new
thing about DACA is that the Secretary Napolitano’s guidance memorandum
articulates limiting criteria without endowing deferred action grantees with
any legal status, something reserved solely for the Congress. In fact, the
Congress has also recognized “deferred action” in Section 202(c)(2) (B)(viii)
of the REAL ID Act as a status sufficiently durable to allow the extension of
driving license privileges.
Courts are loath to
review any non-enforcement decisions taken by federal authorities. See,e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182, 191-92 (1993); Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 138, 1459 (2007). It is up to DHS, rather than to any
individual, to decide when, or whether, to initiate any enforcement campaign. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 US 821, 835 (1985). During the last
Supreme Court term, Arizona v. United States, 132
S.Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) articulated the
true reason why: “(a) principal feature of the removal system is the broad
discretion exercised by immigration officials…Federal officials, as an initial
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all…”
Professors Delahanty
and Yoo do not feel constrained by the wide deference that has traditionally
characterized judicial responses to executive interpretation of the INA. Under
the oft-quoted Chevron doctrine that the Supreme Court announced in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837(1984), federal courts will pay deference
to the regulatory interpretation of the agency charged with executing the laws
of the United States when there is ambiguity in the statute. The courts will
intrude only when the agency’s interpretation is manifestly irrational or
clearly erroneous. Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Nat’l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 US 967 ( 2005),while affirming Chevron, held that, if there is an ambiguous statute requiring
agency deference under Chevron, the
agency’s understanding will also trump a judicial exegesis of the same
statute. Surely the “body of experience”
and the “informed judgment” that DHS brings to INA § 103 provide its interpretations
with “ the power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift& Co., 323 US
134,140(1944). As Justice Elena Kagan
famously noted when she served as the Dean of the Harvard Law School, the
increasingly vigorous resort to federal regulation as a tool for policy
transformation by all Presidents since
Ronald Reagan has made “ the regulatory activities of the executive branch
agencies more and more an extension of the President’s own policy and political
agenda.” Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 Harv.L.Rev. 2245, 2246 (2001).
Indeed, the very notion of Chevron-deference
is “premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gap.” FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 US 120, 159 ( 2000). That is
precisely what the President and DHS have done with respect to their power to
enforce the immigration laws.
This is precisely why
100 law professors argued that the President had the discretionary authority to
extend such relief, which Professors Delahunty and Yoo have acknowledged in
their paper:
Through
no statutes or regulations delineate deferred action in specific terms, the
U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that decisions to initiate or terminate
enforcement proceedings fall squarely within the authority of the Executive. In
the immigration context, the Executive Branch has exercised its general
enforcement authority to grant deferred action since at least 1971
Delahanty & Yoo n. 38.
It is also worth mentioning that while there
is no express Congressional authorization for the Obama Administration to
implement such measures, the President may act within a “twilight zone” in
which he may have concurrent authority with Congress. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Unlike Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, where the Supreme Court held that the
President could not seize a steel mill to resolve a labor dispute without
Congressional authorization, the Administration under through the Morton Memo
and DACA is well acting within Congressional authorization. We agree with
Professors Delahunty and Yoo when they cite Youngstown
Sheet, Delahunty & Yoo n 185. as a rejection of the idea that the
President has “prerogative” power, but the President has not used any
“prerogative power” with respect to DACA relief; he has indeed acted pursuant
to Congressional authorization. In his famous concurring opinion, Justice
Jackson reminded us that, however meritorious, separation of powers itself was
not without limit: “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Id. at 635. Professors Delahanty and Yoo look in vain for
explicit authority in the INA that supports DACA relief, and delve into
instances when Presidents have been able to use “prerogative” power, which they
argue cannot be applied in the context of DACA. They can stop searching:
Congress …may not have
expressly delegated authority to…fill a particular gap. Yet,it can still be
apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority that Congress will
expect the agency to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in
the statute…even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to
a particular result. United
States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229(2001)
Even if arguendo discretion is too weak a
foundation for DACA relief, the equitable merits of such remedial action should
be strong enough to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, as the Supreme Court’s Arizona opinion recognized, it is frequently the case that “ Discretion
in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns.” Delahanty & Yoo, n. 222. That is why Section 240A of the INA
endows the Attorney General with discretion to cancel removal. Contrary to what Professors Delahanty and Yoo
argue, the exercise of executive compassion in the Dream Act context is not a
constitutionally prohibited expression of misplaced sentiment floating without
anchor in a sea of ambiguity but a natural out-growrth of prior initiatives
when dealing with deferred action. Such initiative is entirely consistent with
the Take Care Clause while scrupulously respectful of Congressional
prerogatives to make new law. While Professors Delahanty and Yoo argue that
equity in individual cases may be justified as an exception to the President’s
duty under the Take Care Clause, they claim that the DACA program is not a judgment in equity but
more as a statement of law. We disagree. The President has made clear under
DACA that each case merits an exercise of individual discretion. Each
application has to be supported by voluminous evidence of not just an
applicant’s eligibility, but also evidence as to why the applicant merits an
exercise of favorable discretion. Professors Delahanty and Yoo claim that
equity divorced from reliance on another statute or treaty must be opposed as a
breach of the President’s sworn oath. No such worry here need trouble them for
the Administration not only acts in reliance on its well-settled authority
under the INA but precisely and primarily to infuse such authority with
relevance made ever more insistent by the lack of Congressional action.
Notwithstanding our
rebuttal, the deep scholarship and sincere reservations voiced by Professors
Delahanty and Yoo must not be cavalierly ignored nor summarily dismissed.
Indeed, they are a powerful justification of the need for comprehensive
immigration reform. Only Congress can solve this problem, even though we have
shown that the President did have authority to roll out DACA. The nation waits.